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Abstract
Data Provenance describes what has happened to a users data within a ma-
chine as a form of digital evidence. However this type of evidence is currently
not admissible in courts of law, because the integrity of data provenance can-
not be guaranteed. Tools which capture data provenance must either prevent,
or be able to detect changes to the information they produce, i.e. tamper-proof
or tamper-evident.
Most current tools aim to be tamper-evident, and capture data provenance
at a kernel level or higher. However, these tools do not provide a secure
mechanism for transferring data provenance to a centralised location, while
providing data integrity and confidentiality.
In this thesis we propose a tamper-evident framework to fill this gap by
using a widely-available hardware security chip: the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM). We apply our framework to Progger, a cloud-based provenance logger,
and demonstrate the completeness, confidentiality and admissibility require-
ments for data provenance, enabling the information to be used as digital
evidence in courts of law.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Tamper-evidence tools inform users that their machines have been tampered
with. These tools must be accurate so that they can be used in courts of
law to prove that tampering occurred. They must also provide secure storage
for the evidence, and secure environments for the machines which host them.
Finally, these tools must cover the entire process, from boot time to the time
of inquiry.
Preservation of data integrity is critical in providing valid evidence. The
tools used to provide tamper-evidence must be certified by the authorities and
the court(if requested by the court).
Many technologies provide tamper-evidence. Most of these technologies
are based on audit provenance by collecting the provenance logs, and then
examining these logs in order to detect tampering and anomalies. Provenance
logs in virtual or physical machines keep track of the operations in the sys-
tem (providing answers to questions such as who executes the operation? and
when did the event happen?). But provenance logs can be tampered with by
malicious users, which renders them useless.
Cloud computing presents a new tamper-evidence challenge. Since a phys-
ical machine can contain a set of virtual machines that have a set of logs,
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Figure 1.1: Stages from Boot Time Till Run Time
auditing the logs for every virtual machine is very di cult. Providing secure
storage for the logs is another challenge. However, the main challenge still
arises when an adversary tries to tamper with provenance logs, which means
that we cannot trust the tampered logs. Therefore, it is impossible to know
what has happened in a system if its provenance logs have been tampered
with. It is therefore important to be able to guarantee that provenance logs
have been created, stored, or transmitted securely and that no one can tamper
with them. Malicious users, including insiders with high-level access, have the
ability to access the logging system, and can perform unlogged activities or
tamper with history provenance. This will result in uncertainty about whether
this provenance was generated by the system itself or inserted by someone else.
Therefore, the system must have the ability to monitor everything from boot
time until run time.
Fig. 1.1 shows the stages of the computer system’s boot process (from boot
time until run time). This begins when the user switches on the machine and
the system starts up (bootup). Booting is defined as a bootstrapping process
that starts the Operating System (OS) when the user switches on a computer
system [14]. The boot sequence is the set of operations the computer performs
5when it is switched on. The processor executes code at a pre-defined location
that is Basic Input/Output System (BIOS), which is stored in a flash memory
on the motherboard (0xFFFF0), and must determine which devices are can-
didates during the boot process. The Master Boot Record (MBR) contains
the primary bootloader in the stage 1 bootloader. After the MBR is loaded
into Random Access Memory (RAM), the BIOS yields control to the MBR.
Typically the job of the bootloader in MBR is to load the stage 2 bootloader.
The bootloader is loaded into RAM and executed. The stage 2 bootloader is
loaded and executed in RAM. After this, the stage 2 bootloader passes control
to the kernel image, which checks the system components. Finally, the OS is
loaded.
It is essential to know that the process stages (in Fig. 1.1) run as expected
(e.g., the proper bootloader). Otherwise, any changes occurring in these stages
cannot be detected and we cannot know what has really happened. This means
that a tamper-evidence solution is not credible. For example, a hacker can
change the bootloader (stage 2 in Fig. 1.1) and access the system without
being detected due to the changes in the bootloader [27]. According to this
scenario, tamper-evidence tools should detect any changes in the system from
boot time until run time in order to know what has happened in the system.
To the best of our knowledge, few tamper-evidence solutions provide full
tamper-evidence. This will be discussed further in Chapter 2. The meaning of
the term full tamper-evidence tools is that these tools can detect any tamper-
ing that occurs from boot time until run time. Most of the tamper-evidence
solutions so far proposed focus on collecting provenance logs at the application
level. These solutions then analyse the collected provenance to determine what
has happened in the machine at the application level only. These solutions are
only partial tamper-evidence because as we mentioned in the previous para-
graph, tamper-evidence tools should detect any changes in the system from
boot time until run time (i.e., system level to application level).
Fig.1.2 provides a summarised overview of the content of chapters 1 and 2.
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1.2 Research Goal
In this thesis, we propose a framework to enable full tamper-evidence and
preserve the confidentiality and integrity of data provenance using Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) from boot time until run time (application level). We
also focus on providing remote attestation for all types of data provenance logs
(e.g., system provenance and application provenance) generated in distributed
systems such as cloud computing.
1.3 The Objectives
We have the following objectives:
1. To preserve the confidentiality and integrity of data provenance using
TPM. Our objective is also to store provenance logs in trusted backup
servers to guarantee the availability of data provenance.
2. To provide remote attestation for client machines (physical or virtual)
and backup servers. This will help us to check the status of a remote
machine whether it is in well-known (this terminology is explained in
section 1.6) status or not.
71.4 The Scope
The aim of this thesis is to provide tamper-evidence for data provenance logs in
physical and virtual machines. In our framework, we collect provenance logs
from dedicated client machines and store them in a provenance server. We
later move the old provenance logs from the provenance server to the backup
server for archival purposes. In this thesis we focus on the provenance logs in
the system from boot time until run time. We do not focus on the network
logs. We use special tools for remote attestation to guarantee that we provide
a secure way to check the system status for the provenance logs in remote
machines.
We do not provide tamper resistance solutions, but we use PCRs of TPM
to store the hash values of our important programs (e.g. progger, backup
software) and these PCRs provide tamper-resistance for the provenance that
is stored inside them.
The TPM cannot prevent a cold boot attack [30] (explained in section
1.6), so we assume that this type of attack is not part of the threat model.
1.5 Key Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are summarised as follows:
• We propose a framework to provide tamper-evidence and preserve the
confidentiality and integrity of data provenance using the TPM.
• We store provenance logs in trusted and backup servers to guarantee
the availability of data provenance. The framework also allows users to
check the system status of client machines.
• We develop a framework that provides a secure environment for the
provenance in di↵erent stages; at-creation, at-rest, and in-transit. This
means the provenance logs collected are admissible, complete, and con-
8fidential. Therefore, the provenance logs can be used as evidence in a
court of law.
1.6 Definition of Terms
This section explains the terms used in this thesis.
• Tamper-Evidence is evidence that detects any tampering that could af-
fect provenance logs.
• Partial Tamper-evidence provides evidence about what has happened in
the machine at either system level or application level.
• Full Tamper-evidence is evidence of what has happened in the machine
from boot time until run time.(i.e., system and application levels)
• Chain of Trust : is a validation of each component in a computer system
from boot time by measuring and hashing these components and storing
these hash values inside a TPM chip.
• Root of Trust is a set of functions in a trusted computing module that
is always trusted by the computer’s OS. The root of trust serves as
separate computing engine controlling the trusted computing platform
cryptographic processor on the machine.
• TPM is a hardware chip installed on a motherboard. This chip provides
tamper-evidence for the machine from boot time until run time.
• PCR is a register inside TPM used to store bootloader or machine com-
ponents hash values.
• IMA is a linux kernel module that maintains a list of file hash values and
aggregates the integrity values over this list inside TPM.
9• Remote attestation is a method used to allow users or administrators
to check the system status for remote machines in a secure way (e.g.,
TPM-Qoute).
• Well-Known status The status of the machine is stored inside PCRs,
where PCRs store the hash value of computer components (such as BIOS
or bootloader). Any changes in the PCRs values mean tampering has
occurred, and that means the status of the system after this tampering
will not be normal and thus not Well-Known.
• Cold Boot is a physical attack, in which an attacker is able to retrieve en-
cryption keys from a running operating system after using a cold reboot
to restart the machine [46].
1.7 The Outline
This thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 discusses the history of tamper-evidence, and related work. It
also covers the background of our research area and indicates the gaps
in past and existing solutions.
• Chapter 3 discusses the architecture of TPM, and the components of
TPM.
• Chapter 4 discusses the design of our framework, and presents each com-
ponent in the design.
• Chapter 5 discusses the details of our framework implementation.
• Chapter 6 addresses the advantages of our framework.
• Chapter 7 provides evaluation of our work, by explaining and testing
some attacks that could occur.
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• Chapter 8 presents the conclusion and discusses potential future research
directions.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter presents the literature review. We will first discuss the history of
tamper-evidence, to understand the flow of development in tamper-evidence
tools. We also discuss related work in order to understand the technologies and
methods that provide tamper-evidence by generating, collecting and storing
provenance logs. We then discuss the requirements of legal evidence and how
provenance logs should comply with these requirements to be admissible as
evidence in courts of law. Finally, we discuss gaps in existing tamper-evidence
technologies.
2.1 History of Tamper-Evidence
Fig. 2.1 shows the timeline of the evolution of tamper-evidence research.
In 1964, the committee of the IBM SHARE group was concerned about the
problem of maintaining security of data, especially for those systems which al-
lowed multiple program execution [28]. The committee’s report discussed the
monitoring of program instruction violations at the hardware level. The OS
at that time, IBM OS/MVT, was not designed to prevent deliberate user-
tampering with the OS [11]. The committee suggested that the first step in
preventing impairment of system integrity was to isolate users from each other
and from the OS. Isolation features included storage protection, program in-
terrupts, tape/disk write protection, and privileged instructions. The second
12
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Evolutionary History of Tamper-Evidence
suggestion was for a hardware monitor that could be attached to the existing
hardware to record or trap execution actions. Monitoring how e ciently a sys-
tem is being used can refer to computing resources e.g. I/O channels and disk
drives. The committee also proposed a System Management Facility (SMF) to
provide integrity monitoring; detecting user tampering in the operating system
or files. We will further discuss SMF in section 2.2.1.
In 1981, Wegan and Carter presented a new authentication technique that
could detect any modification or forged message [64]. This technique provided
a secure authentication for messages sent over insecure lines.
In 1985, the United States Department of Defense [41] proposed their own
definition of a trusted computer. The document described the concept of
a trusted computing base; a combination of computer hardware and an OS
that supports untrusted applications and users. The document described the
concept of a trusted computing base; a combination of computer hardware
and an OS that supports untrusted applications and users. Seven levels of
trust were described, ranging from systems with minimal protection through
13
to those providing the highest level of security currently available. The aim
was to provide objective guidelines for the evaluation of both commercial and
military systems. This document was the first to point out that the boot
components should be measured to provide a trusted computer.
In the1990s, the MD4, MD5, and SHA1 [52] were used to detect tampering.
In 1995 Wang and Yu [63] demonstrated a method which enabled attacks on
MD5.
Bishop and Dilger in 1996 presented a tool that analysed programs for pos-
sible race conditions (undesirable situations that occur when a device or system
attempts to perform two or more operations)by checking for race conditions
from ”time-of-check-to-time-of-use” (TOCTTOU) [17]. The results located
five previously undiscovered potential race conditions in a very widely used
program. In 1997, Arbaugh et al. presented the AEGIS architecture [16],
which will be explained in detail in section 2.2. In 2001, Trusted Computing
Platform Alliance (TCPA) announced the release of version 1.0 of its Trusted
Computing Platform Specifications [34]. A TPM can provide a root of trust
by measuring computer components (We will further discuss TPM in chapter
3).
In the 2000s, many tamper-evidence tools were developed using audit logs
to detect tampering. These techniques require auditing and analysis of all
the provenance logs in the machine. The hash chain is one of these tech-
nologies used for tamper-evidence. Like the Merkle tree data structure [21],
a hash chain allows e cient and secure verification of the contents of large
data structures. Accorsi presented BBOX in 2001 [13]. In 2014, Ko and Will
proposed Progger [40], a kernel-level provenance logging tool which supports
tamper-evidence.
14
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2.2 Related Work
This section begins by providing an overview and background of tamper-
evident research. We then review past and existing work in the field of tamper-
evidence for provenance logs. Based on these studies, we will outline the gaps
and limitations in the current research. Fig.2.2 shows all the subsections which
will be addressed in this section. These subsections are the technologies that
provide tamper-evidence. We will mention briefly how these technologies work
and discuss the weaknesses in each tool or technology. In section 2.6 we discuss
the gap in the research on tamper-evidence tools.
2.2.1 System Management Facilities
IBM SHARE group suggested isolating users from each other and from the
OS to prevent deliberate user-tampering with the OS [11]. The OS at that
time was not designed to detect tampering in the file system or in any file in
general. The committee pointed to System Management Facilities (SMFs) to
detect user tampering in the system. An SMF is a IBM’s z/OS-based that
maintains records of information about system and jobs [20] using appropri-
ate formatting. Each SMF record has a numbered type. System-related SMF
records include information about the system configuration, paging activity,
and workload. Job-related records contain information about the CPU time,
SYSOUT activity, and data set activity of each job step. This information
15
identifies the resources that are repeated targets of detected unauthorised at-
tempts to access them, and identifies the users who make detected unautho-
rised requests. However, these data are regularly cleared and saved in related
log files (e.g. system log, SMF data records), and then these records can be
tampered with by an attacker. In addition, a further possible method of at-
tacking system logging is by preventing the generation of log data by means of
appropriate tampering with the generating components. SMF data records are
written, for example, in z/OS entered in a configuration member. By making
changes to this member or by setting exits, it is possible to ensure that certain
SMF data records are no longer written.
2.2.2 Hash Operations
Research by [32] and [68] developed application-level provenance tools for
tracking the data writes of applications and validating the integrity of the
provenance using checksum-based approaches. Schneier and Kelsey employed
hash chains to protect audit trials [56]. They provided algorithms to create an
audit trail and authenticate its entries to detect any tampering in provenance.
Audit logs rarely require the selective confidentiality assurances needed for
provenance. Schneirer and Kelsey present secure logs as a whole, but do not
allow authentication of individual modifications, so we cannot detect in which
provenance record the tampering occurred. Accorsi [13] proposed BBOX, a
secure logging system that covers both the transmission phase and the stor-
age phase. BBOX allows for individual log entry verification and verification
of the complete log file and uses hash chains to provide integrity for the logs.
However, BBOX as a solution is not available yet, as it is undergoing a re-build
to include a robust code for new kinds of crypto protocols.
Zhang et al. [68] considered a set of factors (e.g,. users, processes, trans-
actions), that contributed to one or more data objects through insertions,
deletions, updates, and aggregations. Information about these modifications
was collected and stored in the form of provenance records. The authors stated
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that using a trusted solution (Hardware) is impractical for provenance collect-
ing. However, collecting provenance in unsecured environment is useless, since
if we cannot detect tampering, then we cannot guarantee that the provenance
was not tampered with.
2.2.3 Audit Trails
Auditing and analysing provenance log files is one of the techniques that pro-
vide tamper-evidence for provenance logs. A provenance log file contains
records of logs. These records refer to events or activities that have hap-
pened in the OS [24]; the logs describe the events. Provenance logs describe
the origins and derivation of the data, starting from its original source [19]
[69]. Data provenance, for example provenance logs, can be obtained at sys-
tem, network, and application levels [69, 61]. In [42] Ling presented a solution
using Linux tools (e.g., lastlog command, history command) based on system
logging mechanisms to collect logs. Ling’s proposed framework uses a com-
bination of audit logs and Linux tools to detect tampering. The framework
allows users to find out what is happening in their system. However, using
Linux tools is not enough to detect tampering, since these tools are limited to
the application level and cannot provide a full overview of what has happened
in the machine.
Accorsi [12] mentioned some logging tools that collected provenance logs.
Most of these logging tools use Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) (e.g.,
rsyslog, syslog-ng, and syslog-sign) to transport logs from the devices to the
collector. These are then analysed to detect tampering or unexpected be-
haviour. Logging tools collect provenance from di↵erent machines or from a
local machine without providing security for the provenance while it is at-rest.
In [15], Ansari et al. analysed and measured the performance of an e cient file
system intrusion detection system, and established a complementary approach
for existing access control mechanisms in the Linux kernel 2.6.x.y. They fo-
cused on preserving Modification, Access, and Creation Data and Time Stamp
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(MAC DTS) of files. This mechanism can be used to maintain a log file (e.g.,
provenance log file) that records how the MAC DTS of the files is being ac-
cessed and changed in any underlying file system that is registered to the
Virtual File System (VFS). The mechanism can trap and log activities from
system calls and then hide the log from the file system. The administrator
can unload the module from the system to use this log for tamper-evidence.
However, the authors focus on preserving MAC DTS but not on recording ev-
ery change in MAC DTS and the reasons for these changes. In addition, this
mechanism does not record the type and amount of access. The provenance
which is collected by this mechanism cannot be complete, and therefore cannot
be used as legal evidence.
2.2.4 Tools that Collect Provenance at Network Level
and in Cloud Computing
In [70] Zhou et al. presented Time-Aware Provenance (TAP), a provenance
model that explicitly represents time, distributed state, and state changes.
This mechanism helps in maintaining and querying provenance. The consis-
tent and complete query results are guaranteed despite network variability.
This mechanism captures the time, distribution, and causality of updates.
This mechanism can explain why some data events exist, appear, disappear,
or change. In TAP, some query language enables a declarative specification of
time and changes. However, TAP still cannot answer some questions, particu-
larly where nodes in a distribution system are compromised. In [71] Zhou et
al. proposed Secure Network Provenance (SNP). SNP can securely construct
network provenance graphs in untrusted environments. This technique can
help the administrator to determine the causes and e↵ects of specific system
states (e.g., why a suspicious routing table entry is present on a certain router,
or where a given cache entry originated). SNP provides capabilities for partial
tamper-evidence (e.g., allowing the administrator to track down faulty or mis-
behaving nodes, and to assess the damage such nodes may have caused to the
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rest of the system). In summary, the SNP system can help the administrator
to provide tamper-evidence, but cannot determine the exact provenance of a
given system status. In [29] Haeberlen et al. describes PeerReview, which
is a system that provides accountability and fault detection for a distributed
system. This system maintains a secure record of the messages sent and re-
ceived by each node. When a node’s behaviour deviates from a given reference
implementation, the record automatically detects the unexpected behaviour.
In addition to that, nodes can sign messages, and each node is periodically
checked by a correct node. In summary, this technique can detect violations of
a single property (correctness of execution). It is not designed to check other
properties of interest in the cloud, such as conformance to SLAs, protection of
confidential data, or service availability.
In cloud computing, logs or provenance logs can be used to enhance cloud
accountability and trust [39, 38, 35] as evidence for auditing, forensic, and data
analysis purposes [36]. In general, using logs or provenance logs as evidence
should comply with evidence rules (this will be further discussed in section 2.4).
2.2.5 Capture System Call
Ko and Will proposed Progger [40], a kernel level provenance tool to capture
system calls. Progger can generate provenance logs which include data activ-
ities (e.g., reading, modifying a file) along with actors and related identifying
entities (e.g., process ID, user ID, and timestamp). Progger can be deployed
in cloud environments monitoring data activities within physical and virtual
machines. In the past decade, several data provenance tools have been devel-
oped for cloud computing. However, Progger di↵ers from other kernel-level
monitoring tools such as Forensix [26], which do not provide tamper-evidence
capabilities in their implementation. The Forensix tool generates data logs and
collects them in database servers, after which, users can submit SQL queries
to retrieve the events that occurred in the machine (e.g., PID, start-time, end-
time). The authors did not mention any technology which provides secure,
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integrity-preserving environments for the database server. This potentially
makes it easy for malicious users to mask their tracks by modifying the logs in
the database server or within the server which generates the logs. To the best
of our knowledge, work on Forensix has been discontinued since 2011, with
the last source code update not working as expected in terms of providing a
secure environment.
Many other provenance tools have been proposed but have no tamper-
evidence features in them. For example, in PASS [43] [47], mechanisms were
developed to collect system-level provenance logs from virtual machines. Flog-
ger and S2Logger logged file-level and block-level kernel-space system calls for
cloud virtual machines and physical machines respectively [37, 60]
2.3 Background
2.3.1 AEGIS
In 1997, Arbaugh et al. proposed a secure bootstrap process, ensuring the
integrity of the bootstrap code by constructing a chain of integrity checks
beginning at power-on and extending to the last stage when control passes
to the operating system [16]. The boot will abort if the hashes cannot be
validated.
Fig. 2.3 shows the AEGIS boot control flow. Level 0 contains a small sec-
tion of trusted software, digital signatures, public key certificate, and recovery
code. This level contains the usual BIOS code, and the Complementary Metal-
Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS). The second level contains all of the expansion
cards and their associated Read Only Memory (ROM)s. The boot block in
the third level resides in the bootable device and is responsible for loading the
operating system kernel. The fourth level contains the OS. The fifth and final
level contains user level programs and any network hosts.
Referring to Fig 2.3 the control passes from level to level if and only if
the verification of the component in each level is successfully completed. For
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Figure 2.3: AEGIS Boot Control Flow
example, in level 0 section 1 carries out standard checksum calculations, and
passes control to the next stage. Then the cryptographic hash at BIOS in
section 2 is compared with the shared signature and control passes to the next
level if the verification is successful. In the same way, control continues to pass
to the next level after verification of each component is successfully completed.
In summary, this architecture can measure the components in hardware
levels but cannot support the integrity of data at the user level. Additionally,
this architecture does not support either Dynamic Root of Trust for Man-
agement (DRTM) or remote attestation. If the administrator wants to check
system status remotely, then he cannot do so with the AEGIS implementation.
2.4 Requirements for Digital Evidence
In the previous section we mentioned some of the tools used to collect data
provenance at di↵erent levels. While data provenance describes the origins
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and derivation of the data, the integrity of provenance data is critical for the
integrity of the forensic process. In [18] Braid presented five requirements
that are essential if provenance is to be used as evidence in a court of law.
Data provenance used as evidence should comply with the principles of relia-
bility, authenticity, admissibility, completeness, and believability [18]. All these
requirements should be applied to data provenance to be used as evidence.
2.4.1 Reliability
Provenance must be consistent to be admissible as evidence in a court of law.
We must therefore be sure that the provenance was created, transferred, and
stored in a trusted environment.
2.4.2 Authenticity
Evidence must be positively related to an actual incident and must be su cient
to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. If we
cannot explain an event using specific evidence, we cannot use this evidence
as proof of the event, and we cannot then use this evidence in court or for
forensic purposes.
2.4.3 Admissibility
Evidence must be able to be used in court, and therefore must be relevant;
this means that the evidence must be prove or disprove an important fact in
a criminal case. If the evidence does not relate to a particular fact it will be
considered irrelevant and inadmissible.
2.4.4 Completeness
Evidence must be available from boot time until runtime. While the prove-
nance logs describe the origins and derivation of the data, starting from its
original source, all these provenance logs must be available to describe any inci-
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dent happening at any time (e.g,. from creation time until runtime). Complete
evidence means the story that the material purports to tell has no gaps in it.
2.4.5 Believability
The evidence that is presented must be clearly understandable and believable
by a jury. For example, there is no point in presenting a binary dump of
process memory if the jury has no idea what it all means.
2.5 Tamper-Evidence
A tamper-evidence tool is a device or mechanism that detects any tampering
with provenance logs. Trusted provenance is admissible evidence. Trusted
provenance must applied to all the evidence requirements which are mentioned
in section 2.4. Otherwise, the evidence cannot be used in court.
In section 2.2 we focused on tools that collect data provenance from dif-
ferent levels (system, network, and application). In this section we will focus
on the tools that provide tamper-evidence. In [55, 56], the authors de-
scribe a computational method for making all log entries generated prior to
the logging machine’s compromise impossible for an attacker to read, modify,
or destroy without being detected. However, these solutions rely on a hash
chain which requires auditors to examine every intermediate event between
snapshots. In [44] a tamper-evident log is presented based on a skip list. It
has logarithmic lookup times, which assumes the log is known to be inter-
nally consistent. However, proving internal consistency requires scanning the
full contents of the log. In [51], Pavlou and Snodgrass showed how to in-
tegrate tamper-evidence into a relational database, and prove the existence
of tampering, if suspected. Auditing these systems for consistency is expen-
sive, requiring each auditor to visit each snapshot to confirm that any changes
between snapshots are authorized. In [67] Yumerefendi et al. presented a
network-storage service with strong accountability properties, such as taking
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snapshots of the internal state, and which probabilistically detects tampering
by auditing a subset of objects for correctness between snapshots. In [71], SNP
provides a strong guarantee even in a system that is under attack. It makes
concessions that limit its usability: SNP detects omissions and equivocations
by checking inconsistencies between node logs and multiple faulty nodes might
coordinate their lies in order to avoid detection. However, since SNP provides
answers to queries about behaviour that is observable by at least one correct
node, SNP can answer questions about network activity when one or more of
the communicating nodes are un-compromised and fully functioning. (As the
number of correct nodes in the network decreases, so too does the observable
network state, reducing the network area the administrator can see when she
issues a query.)
Network provenance used in distributed systems is recorded as a global
dependency graph, where the vertices show states at a particular node. The
edges show local processing or message movements across nodes. Such graphs
can refer to queries about potential tampering. Tamper-evident logging could
identify forgeries, omissions, and other types of tampering can be detected and
used as evidence of malpractice.
In [68], Zhang et al. used hash chains to provide tamper-evident prove-
nance in databases, and tackled the issue of providing audit logs of compound
objects rather than just for a linear sequence of operations. The authors be-
lieve that trusted hardware is impractical due to the loosely-organised nature
of provenance collection. In[32], the authors provided a thorough analysis of
threats to provenance systems, and proposed a system using encryption and
chained signatures to provide integrity protection. However, this research did
not provide trusted solutions for data provenance. Hence, there is still the
potential for attacks.
The previous mechanisms mentioned in section 2.2 [43, 47, 37, 60] are
concerned with collecting data provenance in virtual machines and providing
tamper-evidence.
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Ko and Will developed Progger [40], a kernel-level provenance logging tool
which supports tamper-evidence. Progger can capture major data activities
such as kernel-level system calls relating to creation, reading, updating and
deleting actions. To the best of our knowledge, few tools are able to fully satisfy
these rules. The provenance must be trusted; in other words, provenance logs
must be in a trusted environment at-creation, at-rest or in-transit.
The previously described tools for collecting provenance logs cannot fully
meet the five requirements for the use of provenance as evidence. They do not
provide a root of trust for the environment where the provenance is created
and stored.
Table 2.1: Comparison Between Tamper-Evident Technologies
VM PM APP Boot Run-Time Tamper-Evidence
Ling et al. [42] 3 3 3 7 3 NA
Zhou et al.[71], hasan et al. [32] 3 3 7 7 7 Partial
Progger [40] 3 3 7 7 3 Partial
Forensix, Ansari et al. [15] 7 3 7 7 3 Partial
AEGIS [16] 7 3 7 3 7 Partial
TPM + IMA + intel-TXT [9], 3 3 3 3 3 Full
Table 2.1 shows several mechanisms used to collect data provenance at
di↵erent levels, whether from a virtual or a physical machine. To the best of
our knowledge, none of the previous mechanisms mentioned in this chapter
can provide full tamper-evidence tools that satisfy all evidence requirements
(discussed in section 2.4) for data provenance. To enable tamper-evidence and
preserve the confidentiality and integrity of data provenance we must provide
a root of trust so that we can know what has happened in the machine from
boot time until run time. This will help us to know that our provenance has
been created, stored, and transported in a secure and trusted environment.
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2.6 Summary of the Gaps in Tamper-Evidence
Tools
2.6.1 Integrity and Confidentiality
Provenance logs can provide evidence if they can be trusted. The integrity
of the data logs is critical for the integrity of the forensic process. Also, the
confidentiality of data logs is very important to make them admissible as evi-
dence. Hence, the keys which we use to protect logs or provenance logs should
be stored securely. Most tamper-evidence technologies mentioned in section
2.2 cannot provide these conditions for logs or provenance logs.
2.6.2 Provide Tamper-Evident at Boot Stage
As we mentioned in chapter 1, measuring all computer components from boot
time is very important to provide full tamper-evidence. Some kind of attack
could occur based on altering the BIOS version, changing the bootloader or
using a boot-live attack [30]. If the administrator or the user cannot detect
these changes then they cannot provide full tamper-evidence for the machine.
2.6.3 Remote Attestation
Remote attestation is a method used to help the administrator to check remote
machines in a secure way [59]. The administrator or the user can check the
system status to determine whether the machine is running securely. Basically,
the servers are the main machines, which have a very important task to do, and
the administrator will want to check the status of these remote machines rather
than a local machine. This feature is not provided by most tamper-evidence
tools.
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2.6.4 Collecting Provenance at Application Level
Provenance logs can be generated at di↵erent levels. Most of the tamper-
evidence technologies collect provenance logs or logs at the application level.
The administrator in this case is not aware of the system status before that
level (e.g.,system level or boot time). To provide tamper-evidence we must
collect provenance from boot time until run time.
2.6.5 Detect any tampering for the application that gen-
erates provenance logs
When we use provenance logs to detect tampering in the system, we need to
make sure that the provenance generated by the program is correct. Malicious
attack can change the code of the program and then change the details of the
provenance logs. For this reason we need secure storage hash values of these
applications to detect any tampering that may occur.
Chapter 3
Overview of the Trusted
Platform Module
A key component of this thesis is the application of the Trusted Platform Mod-
ule (TPM). Provenance logs cannot be used as evidence for forensic or auditing
purposes, unless they are created, transited and stored in an environment that
has a root of trust. To obtain a root of trust we use a (TPM) for provenance
logs.
A TPM is a computer chip (microcontroller) on the motherboard that is
used to securely store artifacts used in a trusted computer platform [9]. The
term trusted platform means the platform always behaves in the expected
manner for the intended purpose,” as defined by the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG) [22].
3.1 What a TPM Provides
TPM is designed to:
1. Ensure the security of the TPM private keys. Private keys stored in
TPM cannot be extracted from the chip in any form [65].
2. Detect malicious code at run time. This is done by using Intel-Trusted
eXecution Technology (TXT).
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3. Allow the administrator to check the system status for remote machines
in a secure way (Remote Attestation).
3.2 TPM Architecture
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I/O
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(AIK)
Program Code
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Number 
Generator
SHA-1 
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RSA 
Engine Opt-In
Exec 
Engine 
Figure 3.1: TPM Components
The components of the TPM are shown in Fig. 3.1 and are briefly explained
as follows:
• I/O is a component that manages communication over the I/O bus.
• Non-volatile storage (NVRAM) is a component that holds persistent
state information and identity information.
• Random Number generator is the source of randomness for nonce, key
generator and signature in the TPM.
• SHA-1 Engine is an implementation of the SHA-1 algorithm and is a
capability primarily used by the TPM.
• Platform Configuration Register (PCR) is a secure storage register that
contains a 20-byte SHA-1 hash value of a specific computer component.
Some PCRs are set to known values during the boot up process; for
example, a PCR might contain the hash value of a BIOS, or a boot
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loader. The use of di↵erent PCRs set to known values is discussed in
section 3.2.1.
• Key Generator is a function that manages the generation of keys and
nonces.
• Attestation Identity Key (AIK) is used to provide a cryptographic proof
by signing the properties (i.e., signing PCR values such as TPM Quotes)
of the non-migratable key (keys that never leave the TPM).
• RSA Engine is an RSA algorithm used for digital signatures and encryp-
tion.
• Opt-In is a component that allows the TPM to be disabled if necessary.
• Exec Engine is a component that runs the program code to execute a
TPM command.
The I/O component manages the encoding/decoding of information flowing
to and from the bus. Attestation Identity Key (AIK) is attached to the plat-
form where the module is located. It works as an asymmetric key pair that can
guarantee the integrity of the platform?s identity and configuration. The RSA
engine is an asymmetric algorithm used for digital signatures and encryption.
The RSA Engine can also create one-time symmetric keys of up to 2048 bits.
The TPM contains a 2048-bit RSA key pair called anEndorsement Key (EK),
which is used during key wrapping operations, digital signing, and encrypting
large blocks of data. The private parts of the EK and the RSA never leave
the TPM. SHA-1 hash capability is primarily used by the TPM. The hash in-
terfaces are exposed outside the TPM to support measurements taken during
platform boot phases, and to allow environments that have limited capabilities
access to a hash functions implementation of a hash algorithm. The function-
ality is not intended to provide an accelerated hash capability, and there are
no specific performance requirements for TPM hash services. Therefore, this
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Figure 3.2: Root Of Trust
engine should only be used to compute hash values of small chunks of data.
Larger chunks of data should be hashed outside the TPM if possible.
Opt-In allows the TPM to be enabled/disabled, or activated/deactivated
in a secured manner. The program code operates inside the execution engine
and processes the TPM commands streaming from the I/O port.
In Fig.3.2, the root of trust starts from the Core Root of Trust for Mea-
surement (CRTM), which is a trusted code stored in the BIOS boot block. It
reliably measures the integrity values of other entities, and stays unchanged
during the lifetime of the platform. The CRTM is an extension of the normal
BIOS, which first measures other parts of the BIOS and stores the hash values
in PCR-0 and PCR-1 as shown in Fig.3.2, and then passes control to the BIOS
[57].
The BIOS measures the bootloader and stores the hash value of the boot-
loader in PCR-4 and PCR-5 as shown in Fig. 3.2. Then the BIOS passes
control to the bootloader. Next, the bootloader measures the OS kernel image
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and passes control to the OS.
Each step of this boot process stores a hash value in the appropriate PCR
(extend PCR) in the TPM with the measurements taken in the corresponding
step in the boot process. The term extend in Fig. 3.2 means hashing the
measurement value and saving it inside the PCR. The extend function uses
the following method to compute the hash value that is to be stored in the
PCR:
PCRn+1 = SHA1(PCRn + SHA1(Component)) (3.1)
where PCRn+1 denotes the new (expected) value of PCR and PCRn denotes
the current value of the PCR.
Static Root of Trust for Management (SRTM) depicted in Fig 3.2 contains
a set of trusted code stored in the BIOS. This code is executed when the
system is running. All the codes in the chain of the components in in Fig 3.2
are measured by the previous components. (e.g., CRTM measures the BIOS).
Therefore, any changes in the codes of the components in the chain will be
detected. If any change happens in the SRTM phase, the value of PCRn+1
will indicate the change because the value will be di↵erent from the value of
PCRn.
In Fig. 3.2, TCG defines the next phase, called the Dynamic Root of
Trust for Measurement (DRTM), as the measuring of the platform at run
time, which indicates the dynamic chain of trust starts on a request from the
OS via a special processor instruction. Intel developed the Trusted Execution
Technology (Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT)) [65] (further discussed in
section 3.4), which provides the DRTM with the ability to check the secure
mode of the environment at run time by checking the value of PCR-17 as
shown in Fig. 3.2 (which will be discussed in subsection 3.4). Similarly, AMD
implements equivalent technology called the Secure Virtual Machine (SVM)
[4]. IBM provides the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) to maintain
a runtime measurement list (e.g., measurement for a list of sensitive files stored
in PCR-10 as shown in Fig. 3.2) and test the runtime integrity of the platform
32
using a remote attestation feature [45].
3.2.1 PCRs
A PCR is a 160-bit storage location for discrete integrity measurements. The
old version of TPM has 16 PCRs (old version TPM1.1). TPM 1.2 and the
newest version have 24 PCRs, as shown in Fig. 3.2. All PCRs are shielded
locations that will protect the hash data inside the TPM, preventing physical
attacks. The decision about whether a PCR contains a standard measurement
or is available for general use is deferred to the platform specific specification
(e.g., PCR-0 is allocated for BIOS components, while PCR-23 is available for
application). The PCR is designed to hold an unlimited number of measure-
ments in the register, which it does by hashing all updates(see equation 3.1)
using a cryptographic hash.
A TPM provides trusted space, so data (provenance logs) from it will be
admissible and authentic as forensic evidence since the environment is moni-
tored and measured by the TPM. Several of the tools normally used to collect
machine data cannot guarantee the environment in which the data logs are
created and stored. Therefore, a solution that can measure everything in the
machine from boot time until run time is needed. This can be done through a
TPM, because the TPM can store all hash values of the measured components
in a secure and shielded location (PCR),thus guaranteeing that the hash value
is related to the machine status (SRTM and DRTM) and cannot be tampered
with even during a physical attack. Based on this, if an attacker uses any kind
of attack at boot time (e.g., changing the bootloader) or at run time (e.g.,
malicious attack), this can be detected since the expected value of the PCRs
will change. Then we can decide if our data logs have been tampered with or
not. This will be further explained in chapter 5.
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3.2.2 Keys
The TPM contains keys for di↵erent uses. Some of these keys never leave the
TPM and some are migratable. Fig. 3.3 shows the hierarchy of TPM keys.
3.2.2.1 Non-Migratable Keys
Non-Migratable keys are bound to a single TPM. These keys are unique to
a TPM and cannot be migrated or exported from the TPM. For example,
the Endorsement Key (EK) is a public or private key pair, generated during
manufacture [23]. The EK can attest to the authenticity of values produced by
the TPM. This key is unique to each TPM. The EK is a non-migratable key
and can be used to create identity keys. Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs) are
non-migratable keypairs that are essentially aliases for the EK. The private
key of an AIK never leaves the TPM in plaintext and is used only for signing
data originated by the TPM.
Another example of a non-migratable TPM key is the Storage Root Key
(SRK). The SRK is a keypair that is generated internally in the TPM and
has a private key which never leaves the TPM. The SRK is created when the
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owner of TPM takes ownership of the TPM. The SRK is used to encrypt data
using the TPM sealed command (which will be further explained in section
5.3).
3.2.2.2 Migratable Keys
Migratable keys can be moved and used outside a TPM. For example, the pub-
lic part of AIK can be moved to a remote machine for platform authentication
purposes.
3.3 Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
An IMA, an open source trusted computing component can maintain a run-
time measurement list and an combine integrity value for this list, in order to
produce verifiable information about the software running on a Linux-based
system [1]. Remote parties can use this information to assess the execution
environments integrity. The measurement list is obtained by computing an
SHA1 hash value for the files representing executable content and then storing
all measurements since the booting of the system in a kernel-held measure-
ment list. The IMA measures the execution environment of service (binaries,
configurations, and libraries) [33].
The measurement list cannot be compromised by any software attack with-
out the attack being detectable, since the hash value of the measurement list
is stored inside PCR-10. In a trusted boot system, the IMA can be used to
attest the system’s runtime integrity.
In Fig. 3.4 the number ’10’ located at the beginning of each row refers to
PCR-10, which is the default PCR for the IMA measurement. The second and
fourth columns are hash values. The hash value in the fourth column is the
hash value of the chunk file (i.e., filedata-hash). The hash value in the second
column is called template-hash and is the result of concatenating the SHA1
hash value of PCR-0 to PCR-7 (called boot-aggregation) with the hash value
35
Figure 3.4: Measurement List
of the file. This template-hash is calculated by
Template Hash = SHA1(filedata-hash || boot-aggregation) (3.2)
The resulting hash is stored in PCR-10 with boot-aggregation.
Fig.3.5 shows how the IMA is applied for remote attestation. Measurement
is initiated by the measurement agent, which induces a measurement of a
file, stores the measurement in an ordered list in the kernel, and reports the
extension of the measurement list to the TPM.
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Figure 3.5: TPM Based Integrity Measurement
The integrity challenge mechanism allows a remote challenger to request
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the measurement list together with the TPM signing aggregate of the mea-
surement list (step 1 in Fig. 3.5). Upon receiving a result (steps 2 and 3 in
Fig. 3.5), the attesting system first retrieves the signed aggregate from the
TPM and then the measurement list from the kernel. Both (signed aggregate
and measurement list from the kernel) are then returned to the challenger (step
4 Fig. 3.5). Finally, the challenger can validate the information and assess the
trustworthiness of the attesting system’s run-time integrity.
3.4 Intel-TXT
The TPM can measure the machine components at boot time until the kernel
OS takes over (explained in section 3.2). Then we need a mechanism that can
detect an attack at run time (after the OS is up and running). Intel-TXT
is a hardware-based technology, designed to provide security of a computer
platform [10]. Intel-TXT can be deployed in both physical and virtual envi-
ronments.
Intel-TXT can ensure that no unauthorised changes can be made in critical
parts of the code. This validation is performed each time the environment
launches. The administrator should add security policies (e.g., to create non-
migratable keys and tell the TPM to not allow anyone but the owner to evict
it) to make sure that the machine runs in a trusted environment. Servers
that implement Intel-TXT can demonstrate (attest) that they comply with
a specific trust policy, and thus can be used to form pools of trusted servers
based on the established policies. For example, Intel-TXT allows an operating
system to launch if it knows the platform and system software are secure and
trusted.
A successful measured launch has the following requirements:
• Authenticated Code Module (ACM) must be valid.
• Server Platform must pass the launch the control policy.
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• Measurement List Environment (MLE) code measurement has passed
the launch control policy.
We briefly outline the requirements for installing intel-TXT and then we
explain how this technology works.
The requirements for installing Intel-TXT are as follows:
1. Hardware Requirements:
The TPM chip must be integrated with the chipset. Both of them work
together to check the measurement and security of the system. Therefore,
the hardware should support Intel-TXT [49].
2. Software Requirements:
Fig 3.6 shows the MLE component that verifies the software to guarantee
that all components are secure.
The MLE includes:
• An ACM to perform the measured launch, starting the dynamic chain
of trust.
• A Server Platform which includes the BIOS code, BIOS configuration,
System Management Mode (SMM) code, option ROM code and config-
uration, system state, MBR and boot configuration.
• An Initial system software code (referred to as MLE code) that sets up
the platform to protect the OS/hypervisor kernel code.
In Fig. 3.6 the dynamic chain of trust (which is carried out by Intel-TXT)
starts following a request from the OS via a special processor instruction, which
measures and verifies another ACM (the SINIT ACM), which will oversee the
secure launch. SINIT is an acronym for Secure Initialization; it initializes the
platform so the OS can enter a secure mode of operation. The SINIT ACM
performs additional checks, which include making sure the BIOS has passed
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Figure 3.6: The mechanism of Intel-TXT
its security checks and has locked the platform configuration. The ACM then
measures the OS (a portion of the OS referred to as the trusted OS) and
invokes a launch control policy (LCP) engine which is stored within the TPM
NVRAM (NVRAM is an area of flash storage inside TPM). This determines
whether the platform configuration and OS can be trusted (as defined by the
policy set by the system administrator).
After this, once a secure CPU-contained environment is created, the signa-
ture module is validated and its identity is sent to the TPM (PCR-17). Then
the signature module measures the Measured Launch Environment (MLE) and
sends the result to the TPM (PCR-18).
Enabling Intel- TXT technology in our framework is very important since
we aim to provide security for the environment in which the provenance logs
are created and stored at run time. We use this technology to provide a secure
environment at run time, and enable awareness of what is going on in the
machine at run time.
The features and advantages of using Intel- TXT are listed below.
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1. Intel-TXT provides features as follows:
(a) Secure measurement
(b) Dynamic launch mechanisms via special instructions
(c) Configuration locking
(d) Sealed secrets
2. Intel-TXT helps detect and/or prevent software attacks such as:
(a) Attempts to insert nontrusted VMM (rootkit hypervisor)
(b) Reset attacks designed to compromise secrets in memory
(c) BIOS and firmware update attacks
Intel-TXT uses enhanced processor architecture, special hardware, and as-
sociated firmware that enables certain Intel processors to reduce the overheads
associated with system virtualization and allow guest OSs and applications to
run in their intended modes.
Trusted Boot (TBoot) is an open source, prekernel/VMM module that uses
Intel-TXT to perform a measured and verified launch of an OS kernel/VMM
[3]). TPM NVRAM stores the launch control policy (LCP). The SHA-1 hash
of these components is compared with the hash value that has already been
shared in NVRAM. If the comparison results match, the OS/hypervisor is
running in a secure environment. The policy consists of the platform owner
specifying the minimum version of ACM, the platform configuration as mea-
sured by (PCR-0 till PCR-7) in the TPM containing known good values, and
the MLE measurement, which is a known good value.
3.5 TrustedGRUB
TrustedGRUB is an enhancement of the open-source bootloader GNU GRUB
[5]. When BIOS measures the bootloader located in the master boot record,
control is transferred to the loader (TrustedGRUB) (shown in Fig. 3.2). The
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chain of trust is carried on by TrustedGRUB by measuring the integrity of
the OS configured to load and extending the result into PCRs (i.e., PCR-8 to
PCR-14). The hash values of the PCRs provide the evidence to attest system
status at boot time. Fig 3.7 shows how the bootloader is measured and how
the bootloader receives and passes control to finally achieve a chain of trust.
PCR-8 and PCR-9 contain information about the bootloader (Trusted-
GRUB). If an attacker tries to access the machine by changing the boot of
the machine (e.g., boot attack[31] ) then it is easy for machines that contain
TPM to detect this kind of attack. Since the value of the current bootloader
is secured in PCR-8 toPCR-14, changing the bootloader will change the hash
values inside PCR-8 - PCR-14.
Furthermore, TrustedGRUB o↵ers an important feature to enable verifica-
tion of the integrity of an arbitrary file after the OS is loaded. With the help
of this functionality, users can continue the chain of trust with the necessary
41
component (i.e., the OS) to enable integrity checking. This functionality is
realised by providing a ”check file” option, where TrustedGRUB will load and
verify given files by comparing the SHA1- results with pre-calculated values
stored in the check file. The integrity of all files listed in this check file is ver-
ified during the boot process by comparing the referenced hash values to the
newly computed values. If some of these do not match, a warning is displayed.
All check files verified are extended into PCR-13.
In addition, TPM encrypts the data using TPM keys. This encryption can
also depend on certain PCR values. If the value of PCR is changed for any
reason, there is then no way to decrypt the data [5]. (we will further discuss
this in chapter 5 ).
Chapter 4
Framework Design
In this chapter, our design framework is discussed. The design focuses on the
preservation of the confidentiality and integrity of data provenance, and on the
tools that we use to generate these provenances. In our framework we also aim
to ensure easy availability of the provenance logs to the system administrator
at any time.
In the following sections we will explain our framework’s design and the
components that we used in constructing this framework.
4.1 Client Side
1. Client : In Fig. 4.1, the client machine could be a virtual or a physical
machine. This client machine collects provenance logs and is thus the
source of the provenance logs. Therefore, it is very important to provide
a trusted environment to guarantee that the provenance logs at-creation,
or at-rest are in a trusted environment. To achieve this, client machines
must have a TPM chip. This chip must be enabled and active in order
to work properly. As we mentioned in chapter 3, the TPM chip mea-
sures the machine components from boot time until the OS is up and
running in the SRTM stages. The TPM then keeps the hash values for
these components at SRTM stages inside the appropriate PCR in the
TPM chip. Then the administrator can remotely read these values us-
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Figure 4.1: Framework Design
ing a special protocol for security reasons (this will be further discussed
later in the chapter). The administrator is thus able to check the client
system status frequently (e.g., to detect if an attacker has changed the
bootloader, or for the presence of a malicious user).
2. Provenance Generator : In Fig. 4.1 the provenance generator is a
kernel-space provenance logging tool. The reason for using a provenance
generator is that this tool can record all kernel events; based on these
provenance logs we can tell what operations have been executed in the
machine. This tool must be compatible with virtual and physical ma-
chines and must be able to allow all cloud stakeholders to trace their
data. The provenance generator should also collect provenance from the
lowest possible atomic data actions. In addition, this tool must be ac-
curate and have granular timestamp synchronisation across several ma-
chines. Finally, we provide integrity for this tool by extending (hashing
the provenance generator code) and storing this hash value in PCR-23
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which is allocated for this purpose. We can thus guarantee that any po-
tential tampering with this tool code can be detected by comparing the
new hash value of the code with the one that is stored in PCR-23 inside
the TPM. The mechanism that the administrator applies to remotely
check the hash value of PCR-23 for the client machine will be further
discussed in chapter 5.
3. Bu↵er : The bu↵er is created in the client machine. This bu↵er tem-
porarily receives provenance logs from the provenance generator. We
reduce the probability of attack and can detect any tampering that may
occur in this file. Our software checks the time and the size of the bu↵er.
If the time limit is exceeded, or the bu↵er becomes full, then the bu↵er
content will fill the chunk (the provenance log file).
4. Chunk : The chunk is created once the bu↵er becomes full or the time
is exceeded. The chunk is then moved into storage. The data inside the
chunk are the provenance logs, which were collected by the provenance
generator (Progger). Storing the provenance logs inside the chunk file
based on the time and the size of the bu↵er will help the administrator
to check specific provenance logs at specific times, where the creation
date and time of the chunk will be the name of the chunk and of the
hash chunk file.
5. TPM : The TPM is a chip required to provide integrity, confidential-
ity and reliability for the data provenance logged. The hash value of
the program of the provenance generator (e.g., Progger) is stored inside
a PCR-23 to detect any change that may happen in the code. After
this, IMA is used to detect both expected and unexpected events in
the provenance log file. TPM stores the hash values of measurements
for the CRTM, BIOS, bootloader, OS kernel, and OS. During runtime,
Intel-TXT and IMA can detect attacks at the DRTM phase. We assume
that the storage used to store data provenance applies the Opal TCG
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technology to enable full disk encryption [2]. Intel-TXT can be config-
ured to only allow the OS to launch if it knows the platform and system
software are secure and trusted (as defined by the data centre’s policy).
LCP guarantees that OS/Hypervisor runs if and only if the current pol-
icy matches with its (LCP) policy which consists of specific values of
PCRs. This secure launch control policy allows the software to operate
in a trusted OS, but only after validating that the platform configuration
and system software meet the system administrator policy [65].
4.2 Provenance and Backup Server
In this section we will explain our design for Provenance and Backup servers.
• Provenance server: This server is used by the administrator to monitor
the system status in client machines and backup servers. This server
receives all data provenance (provenance logs) collected by client ma-
chines. In addition, the provenance logs consolidated in the provenance
servers can be examined by the administrator in the short term. Because
the files rapidly become very large, they are subsequently moved to the
backup server. Thus, the idea behind using a provenance server (which is
used by the administrator) in our design is to give the administrator the
ability to frequently check the system status of client machines (PCRs);
the administrator can detect if any tampering has happened in the client
machines. Also, by temporarily storing the provenance logs it is possible
to check the confidentiality of these provenance logs. This server will
be a verifier server; the administrator can remotely check system status
(check specific PCRs in client machines or backup servers). This feature
is called remote attestation. In this system, we use a special protocol
design from TCG to ensure that the connection between machines is se-
cure. This server runs in a secure environment, as does the client server.(
This server has a TPM, to allow the administrator to frequently check
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the status of his provenance server.
• Backup Server : In the longer term, the backup server works as an
archive server for the provenance logs when the number of provenance
logs becomes too large to be stored in the provenance server. The large
numbers of provenance logs in the backup server can also be used for
data analysis purposes. The provenance logs in the backup server are
sealed by a TPM sealed feature (i.e. they are encrypted). This feature
adds confidentiality to our framework, since the key which is used to
encrypt provenance logs is kept in a safe place inside the TPM. This key
never leaves the TPM chip.
Both provenance and backup servers must have a TPM, Intel-TXT, and
IMA. The provenance server is accessed by the administrator, who has
the ability to examine the data provenance. The administrator must
have the TPM-ownership password to gain access to the TPM features.
In this framework, groups of provenance logs from a client machines
provenance server are grouped in a file called the chunk Every chunk,
along with its hashed value, will be transferred via the secure Transport
Layer Security (TLS) to the provenance server. The administrator can
check the hash values from the client machines and compare them with
the hash values stored in the provenance server. We assume that the
hash function (used to hash chunks) applies a keyed-hash message au-
thentication code (HMAC) (e.g., HMAC-SHA1). The secret key used for
the HMAC is shared by all the machines with the support of the TPM.
We assume that the connections between clients, provenance and backup
server are secure, using a TLS connection. However, as we will see in chapter 5,
the administrator who works on the provenance server uses a special protocol
(TPM-Quote [6] or TCG IF-M protocol [50]) for remote attestation. For the
data provenance (provenance logs) we will explain (in chapter 5 and chapter
7 how we can detect any tampering that may occur in the data provenance,
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even if the tampering occurs in the transmission stage.
Algorithm 4.1 Our Software in The Client machine
void generator (log)
if (bu↵er.full() || bu↵er.timeout()) then
Chunk chunk = new Chunk(bu↵er.getData())
chunkStore.add(chunk)
hashStore.add(hash)
bu↵er.flush()
chunk.getbackup()
hash.getbackup()
else
bu↵er.add(log)
end if
This algorithm 4.1 summarises our framework’s software in client machines,
provenance and backup servers. In client machines, the provenance generator
starts to generate the provenance logs and fills the bu↵er. If the bu↵er becomes
full or the time limit is exceeded, the provenance is moved to the chunk and
the bu↵er is flushed (reset). Then the chunk is hashed using HMAC. The
chunk and hash file are transferred to the provenance server through a TLS
connection.
We extended our software (Algorithm 4.1) to utilise an unused/ available
PCR, (e.g., PCR-16) to detect any change that occurs due to an attack on the
software of the Algorithm 4.1. Hence, any tampering a↵ecting the program
will be detected. Meanwhile, the administrator should frequently remotely
check PCR-17 on the client machines to make sure that the provenance is
created in secure mode. PCR-17 is related to the run-time environment used
by Intel-TXT technology.
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Figure 5.1: Framework Flowchart
In this chapter we will explain the implementation of our framework. We
had client virtual machines and two physical servers as the provenance and
backup servers. All tools used in preparing this framework were either kernel
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modules or open sourced software in addition to the TPM chip, e.g., IMA,
TPM-Quote, and Intel-TXT. The components of the framework and how it
is based on the TPMare shown in Fig. 5.1. The client machines, provenance
and backup server all had a TPM. Each PCR inside a TPM has its own
responsibility (e.g., PCR-0 for BIOS).
In our implementation we used CentOS 6.4 with kernel 2.6.33 for all ma-
chines. Progger (a provenance generator) was deployed in the client machines.
The machines came with TPM v1.2; the vendor for this chip is ATMEL.
Trusted Execution was activated from the BIOS to enable Intel-TXT. Software
such as TrouSerS [8], TrouSerS-devel package, and TPM-tools were installed
for communication with the TPM chip. TPM-Quote was also installed in the
provenance server for remote attestation.
To enable Intel-TXT in a machine, a user must first activate the TPM
from BIOS, after which Intel-TXT can be activated from BIOS. In our frame-
work we used kernel 2.6.33 for the physical machines; for virtual machines we
used Xen*3.4. Trusted Boot (TBoot) [3] is an open-source bootloader used
to launch Intel-TXT, the SINIT command [7] and pre-kernel/hypervisor mod-
ule that use Intel TXT to perform a measured and verified launch of an OS
kernel/hypervisor as discussed in chapter 3.
Fig 5.1 are discussed as follows :
5.1 Client machine
5.1.1 Provenance Generator and Provenance Logs Bu↵er
The provenance generator is a kernel-space provenance logging tool. In our
case, the provenance generator was Progger (a cloud-based provenance logger).
Table 5.1 shows examples of Progger’s log format. The first row shows Prog-
ger’s log format for an open system call. This system call request by a user
generates Progger’s output as a provenance generator, which is; PID,PPID,
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SID,..., etc, as can be seen in the first row in table 5.1. Rows [2-5] in table
5.1, relate to other operations such as close file, read, write and create socket
respectively.
Fig.5.2 shows the scenario for collecting provenance logs on the client side.
The left side in Fig.5.2 illustrates the components in the client machine which
are the provenance generator (in our case, Progger), bu↵er, and chunk. Progger
is a kernel-space logger which potentially empowers all cloud stakeholders to
trace their data. The right side of Fig.5.2 is a sample table of Progger’s
logs. Progger’s output contains information (provenance logs) generated by
Progger when one of the system calls requests, as shown in the table 5.1.
In our framework, Progger writes these provenance logs in the bu↵er. The
logs are maintained by IMA [1](see section 3.3 as will be discussed in section
5.1.2). When the client is operating at runtime, Progger (i.e., the provenance
generator) records the provenance logs. Each record in the logs includes an
action or event like the records in table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Progger’s Log Format
System Call Progger Log Format
Open Type,User,PID,PPID,SID,PSID,Program,File,WD,Flags,Mode,FD
Close Type,User,PID,PPID,SID,PSID,FD
Read Type,User,PID,PPID,SID,PSID,FD,O↵set,HexData
Write Type,User,PID,PPID,SID,PSID,FD,O↵set,HexData
Socket Type,User,PID,PPID,SID,PSID,Program,SockFD,sType,sProtocol,sFamily
We hash the Progger software code using the extend function to update
the old value of the PCR, as illustrated in the equation 3.1, and store the hash
value in PCR-23. Hence, any attacks tampering with the Progger code can
be detected by checking the hash value of PCR-23. A bu↵er is prepared for
newly generated provenance logs. A time counter is used to evaluate the age
of the bu↵er. Once the bu↵er is filled with Progger’s provenance logs or the
time counter exceeds a fixed amount of time (i.e., timeout), the provenance
logs inside the bu↵er are removed to a newly created chunk. After that, the
bu↵er is cleared and the time counter is reset. The idea of using the time
counter together with the bu↵er size is that in some cases the data may not
fill the bu↵er for a long period of time (i.e., no arrival of new provenance logs).
By setting a maximum time as well as a maximum fill, the time setting can
over-ride the fill requirement and even if the bu↵er is not full, it will still be
extracted to the chunk and the bu↵er and the timer will reset. Similarly, if
the bu↵er fills before the time limit is reached, the fill setting over-rides the
time setting and the content is removed to the chunk even though the time
limit has not been reached. The bu↵er content can also be taken out to a
chunk in the event that the client machine is halted at any time (e.g., power
disruption). For these reasons, we take the time counter into consideration in
addition to the bu↵er size.
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Figure 5.3: Measuring the chunk file by IMA
Figure 5.4: Using IMA to detect tampering could happen for the chunk
5.1.2 Create Chunk
Fig.5.2 shows the chunk component. Once the bu↵er is full or when timeout
is reached, a new chunk is created to store the provenance logs retrieved from
from the bu↵er. The chunk size is equal to the amount of data retrieved from
the bu↵er. We used the IMA technology to measure the chunk by verifying
the PCR-10 (as explained in chapter 3, IMA measures all system-sensitive
files - executables, mapped libraries, and files opened for reading by root and
stores the hash value of the measurements in PCR-10). IMA can help the
administrator to detect operations occurring in a specific sensitive file (i.e., the
chunk). For example, in Fig. 5.4 the file 150412-144105.txt is a created chunk
file. This chunk file can be detected as a tampered chunk, where in Fig. 5.4
there are four rows after the IMA command; each row means that an operation
happened in this file. The number ‘10’ located at the beginning of each row in
Fig. 5.4 refers to the PCR-10 that is the default PCR for IMA measurement.
We use the command ”cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii-measurements —
grep (the file name)” to check the sensitive file when we want to know if it has
been tampered with or not.
The second and fourth columns are hash values. The hash value in the
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fourth column is the hash value of the chunk file (i.e., filedata-hash). The hash
value in the second column is called template-hash, and is the result of con-
catenating the SHA1 hash values of PCR-0 to PCR-7 (called boot-aggregation)
with the hash value of the chunk file. This template-hash is calculated using
the formula
Template Hash = SHA1(filedata-hash || boot-aggregation) (5.1)
. This result will be stored in PCR10 with boot-aggregation. The file is
named with its creation timestamp and that helps the administrator to find
the provenance by specifying the time that the administrator is looking for.
We extended our program ( Algorithm 4.1) to utilise an unused/ avail-
able PCR, (i.e., PCR-16) to detect any unauthorised changes to this program.
Hence, any tampering a↵ecting the program will be detected. The adminis-
trator should also frequently remotely check PCR-17 (as explained in 5.4) on
client machines to make sure that the provenance was created in secure mode.
PCR-17 is related to the run time environment used by Intel-TXT technology,
as discussed in section 3.4. When Progger writes provenance logs direct into
the bu↵er, and then transfers these provenance logs to the chunk, this helps
the administrator to monitor the chunk file. After the chunk file is created and
filled with provenance logs from the bu↵er, no-one can tamper with or modify
this file. If the chunk file in a client machine is tampered with (even by a root
user), it will be detected by IMA (e.g., Fig. 5.4, IMA mechanism explained in
section 3.3). Transferring data provenance from the bu↵er to the chunk file
allows us to monitor this chunk file. Otherwise, we cannot decide if modifica-
tion (tampering) happened in Progger (root user) or as a result of a malicious
attack. To address that problem we asked Progger to write provenance logs
directly into the bu↵er, and then move these provenance logs into the chunk
file.
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Figure 5.5: The mechanism of hash chunk and how the administrator remotely
check the status of client machine
5.1.3 Hash Chunk and Transfer the Chunk to the Prove-
nance Server
Hashing the chunk provides integrity for the provenance, and that helps us to
know whether the chunk has been tampered with or not. Fig. 5.5 shows that
the chunk file is hashed in the client machine once it is created. Periodically
chunks, along with their hash values, are transferred to the provenance server.
The administrator, who has access to the provenance server and is already
the administrator for the TPM chip can check the PCR-17 (see section 3.4)
of client machines remotely using TPM-Quote (explained in section 5.4) or
OpenPTS tool to make sure that the chunks are created and transferred in a
trusted environment(Secure Mode).
To hash the chunk we use Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HAMC).
The key that we use for hashing is shared by the client machines and the prove-
nance server.
Fig. 5.5 shows that the administrator uses the tpm quote command to
check the status of the client machine (tpm getquote). This command mea-
sures the current value of PCR, and returns this hash value with the nonce
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and Universally Unique Identifier (UUID).
5.2 Provenance Server
The aim of this server is to collect provenance from client machines and allow
the administrator to examine these provenance logs, then decide if these have
been tampered with or not.
Fig.5.6 shows the steps that the administrator carries out to make sure
that the provenance was generated in a trusted environment (PCR-17). If the
administrator wants to check a specific chunk file, he will hash the appropriate
chunk file from the provenance server and compare the hash value with the hash
value that is already stored in the provenance server. If the comparison does
not match, it provides evidence of tampering. The administrator should check
the runtime measurement from the PCR-17 value frequently on the provenance
server. This will allow the administrator to detect any attacks on the server
(explained in chapter 3.4). Additionally, PCR-23 in the provenance server
is allocated for backup software, to make sure that the software is working
in a secure environment and that no-one can tamper with the software code.
PCR-10 will help the administrator of this server to know what happens to
the provenance logs file or hash files using IMA features to measure sensitive
files like Fig.5.3 and Fig.5.4.
The hash function (used to hash chunks) applies a keyed-hash message
authentication code (HMAC) (e.g., HMAC-SHA1). The secret key used for
the HMAC is shared by all the machines with the support of the TPM.
Chunks from the provenance server are then backed up in the backup server.
The provenance server receives data provenance logs from di↵erent clients.
These logs are used to provide tamper-evidence for the client machines to
guarantee that these logs were created and transferred in secure environments
(explained in section 3.4). All provenance logs in the provenance and backup
servers are encrypted using Opal technology [2], which provides confidentiality
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Figure 5.6: The operations on Provenance Server
for the provenance.
When the administrator wants to examine a specific chunk file at a specific
time, he can find this file easily, since the file store is based on the time that
it was created. Then he hashes this file and compares the result of the hash
file with the hash from the original client, to detect whether tampering has
occurred in this file.
Tboot (Trust boot) was used in our framework. The LCP checks the
appropriate MLE and SINIT module to be loaded. If the MLE policy is not
met, an Intel-TXT reset occurs. As a result, a Late Launch will never be
executed until the system is restarted. However, the inability to perform a
Late Launch does not protect against someone using the system because it
does not have the ability to prevent the boot process, and so may allow others
to use the system. Though so, it stops users from accessing Locality 2 of
the TPM which is responsible to extend PCR 19-22. NVRAM has a limited
number of write cycles during the TPM’s lifetime, but the use of a symmetric
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master key that is only read from NVRAM in the common case can greatly
extend its life.
Late Launch does not enforce anything; it simply provides a means by
which measurements are taken and stored in the TPM. As a result we enforce
di↵erent actions. For example, if the goal is to build disk encryption, the OS
could be encrypted with a key sealed to specific PCRs (17-22) which match the
desired/trusted OS. The important part is if the proper environment has not
been loaded (e.g. a malicious user changed the boot loader, and did not trigger
a Late Launch) the PCRs values will not match, hence the key to decrypt the
OS will be inaccessible (UNSEAL will not work).
The administrator should check the runtime measurement from PCR-17
values frequently on the provenance server. This will allow the administrator
to detect any attacks on the server.
PCR-23 in this provenance server we allocated for backup software to en-
sure that the software is working in a secure environment. PCR-10 will help
the administrator of this server to know what happens for data provenance
files or hash files using IMA features to measure sensitive files such as chunk
or hash chunk files (e.g., Fig. 5.3).
Fig.5.7 shows the mechanism for measuring the machine components and
how it is stored in the TPM. In this section we will focus on how Intel-TXT
works, what the administrator reads from PCR-17, and how it indicates a
secure environment. Briefly, for the SRTM stages, CRTM is executed by the
CPU and used to measure the BIOS firmware. Then it will return the result
of the measurement (SHA-1 hash) back to the TPM. Then execution passes
to the BIOS and so on for all components.
In the DRTM stage, the processor is not measured by the SINIT AC Mod-
ule. Whenever a secure CPU-contained environment is established, the module
signature is validated and communicated to the PCR17 that can measure the
Measured Launch Environment (MLE) and transmits this to the PCR 18.
Both provide a means of measuring the running environment, which in-
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Figure 5.7: Intel-TXT technique and Tboot
volves sending measurements to the TPM PCRs; mainly PCR-0 for SRTM
and PCR17 for DRTM.
5.3 Backup Server
Fig.5.8 shows the backup server. The backup server is designed for archiving
purposes. Since we cannot keep the logs and provenance logs for any length
of time in the administrator server (provenance server), for storage purposes
we use a backup server. The backup server has two databases; the first one is
used for provenance log files (chunk file) and the second database is used for
hash chunk files.
We use the TPM Storage Root Key (SRK) (explained in section 3.2.2) to
secure these provenance logs. These keys are stored inside the TPM and never
leave it. This sealed (encrypted) data (provenance logs) allows the adminis-
trator to protect the data itself by binding the data with PCRs specified (e.g.,
Fig. 5.8).
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Figure 5.8: Backup Server
TPM Seal outputs a ciphertext, which contains the sealed data and infor-
mation about the platform configuration required for its release. The TPM
includes a random number generator that can be used for key generation. The
backup servers have two databases for chunks and their hash values. Hence,
when tampering occurs in a chunk or its hash value, the tamper will be de-
tected by comparing the new hash value of the tampered data with the data
stored inside the databases.
The idea of using the TPM sealdata command is that TPM has 24 PCRs
and at boot time, all PCRs are initialised to known-value (e.g., PCR-0, PCR-
1 for BIOS). The only way to change the values of writable PCRs (e.g.,
PCR-23, PCR-16) is to use the Extend function (invoking TPM operation).
When TPM invokes the Extend function, it updates the value of the PCR
indicated by index SHA-1 hash of the previous value of PCR concatenated
with the data provided (equation 3.1). These PCRs values cannot be changed
without invoking TPM operations, since they are shielded inside the TPM
60
chip. Therefore, the TPM presents a simple interface for binding data to the
current platform configuration. The seal command in Fig. 5.8 takes a set of
PCRs (we use in Fig.5.8 PCR-[12], PCR-14, PCR-[23]) indices as input, and
encrypts the provenance data provided using its Storage Root Key (SRK), a
key that never leaves the TPM. The SRK outputs the resulting ciphertext,
along with an integrity-protected list of the indices provided and the values of
the corresponding PCRs at the time the Seal was invoked. It is also possible
to provide the Seal command not only with the PCR indices of interest, but
also with the values those PCRs should have before Unseal will decrypt the
data. The Unseal command takes in a ciphertext and PCR list created by the
Seal command. The TPM verifies the integrity of the list of PCR values, and
then compares them against the current values of those PCRs. After this, if
they match, the TPM decrypts the file.
Using TPM keys guarantees that the provenance logs which we decrypted
using these keys can decrypt if and only if the system is running in a well-
known situation(secure mode), which is indicated by the PCRs we chose when
we decrypted our data. Because PCR values reflect the running environment,
the sealed operation uses those values as keys to encrypt the data.
5.4 TPM-Quote
In this section we will explain the remote attestation technique. Remote attes-
tation checks the status of a remote machine (attester) to determine whether it
is running in a secure environment or not. The machine that the administrator
uses is called the challenger. The architecture for remote attestation consists
of two major components; the integrity measurement architecture (which is
the measurement list in the attester and is explained in section 3.3), and the
remote attestation protocol. We will use the remote attestation protocol rec-
ommended by IBM [45].
We use TPM-Quote [6] for remote attestation. TPM-Quote is a collecting
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Figure 5.9: Remote Attestation Using TPM-Quote
program that provides support for TPM-based attestation using the TPM
quote operation. As we know that theTPM has 24 PCRs, these PCRs contain
hash values referring to specific values for specific components in the machine
(e.g., PCR-0 for BIOS, PCR-17 for secure environment). Subsequently, any
change in this hash value is evidence that tampering has occurred. During
provisioning, the hash values of the PCR are compared with the hash value
produced by TPM.
In Fig. 5.9 shows the steps of TPM-Quote recommended by IBM [45].
TPM-Quote allows us to use the TPM random number generator to produce
a nonce value and an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) including a public and
private key pair. The provenance server sends the nonce value and AIK to a
remote machine (e.g., the backup server and client machine to provide authen-
ticity between them). Then, the remote machine uses its private key to sign
the PCR values which are requested for attestation by the server, and then re-
turns the signed PCR values to the provenance server. The provenance server
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verifies the signed PCR values using the public key of the remote machine.
This nonce helps protect the signed PCR values against replay attacks. Using
this technique, we achieve authentication between two machines and ensure
that the remote machine runs in a secure mode.
In fig 5.9 the challenger requests the measurement list from the attester.
This request contains a nonce value. (generated by the challenger TPM) as
step 1. After the attester receives the request with the nonce value (step 2,
3) it retrieves the measurement list (Fig 5.9, step 4). In step 5, the challenger
validates the integrity of the attester machine by comparing the value it already
has with the value that it has just received from the attester, as shown in Fig
5.9.
When the administrator takes TPM ownership he is asked for the SRK key
password. Once he enters the password, keys must be generated. AIK is one
of these keys, and the public part of the key is used for remote attestation.
Chapter 6
Framework Advantages
In this chapter we will explain some of the principal advantages of our imple-
mentation. With the support of TPM, our framework can provide admissible,
complete, authentic, reliable and believable aspects of tamper-evidence for data
provenance.
6.1 Guarantee that Data Provenance is cre-
ated and transmitted in a secure environ-
ment
The values of PCRs can provide static and dynamic roots of trust. Provenance
logs are created, stored and transferred between machines, and if any changes
occur in the provenance logs or to the machine components (e.g., bootloader
and OS kernel), the values of the PCRs will change and can be provided as
tamper-evidence for the data provenance. Since these PCRs cannot be ac-
cessed and tampered with by unauthorised users, the provenance logs, along
with the tamper-evidence can be guaranteed to be admissible, complete, au-
thentic, reliable and believable evidence, usable in a court of law. The follow-
ing subsections explain how we provide tamper-evidence for each framework
component:
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6.1.1 Tampered Chunk
In this framework, chunks represent collections of provenance logs. Hence,
tampered chunks mean tampered provenance logs. The aim of IMA is to
detect whether files have been accidentally or maliciously altered, whether in
remote or local machines. Where IMA maintains a runtime measurement list
and stores hash values inside TPM (PCR-10)s, the measurement list cannot be
compromised by any software attack. Tampering in chunk files can be detected
by the IMA module through PCR-10.
6.1.2 Tampered Provenance Generator
The program of the provenance generator (in our framework this is Progger)
may also be tampered with, but this tampering can be detected. For example,
an attacker changes the Progger code and places a modified Progger program
in a client machine. However, the hash value of the original Progger is stored
in PCR-23. Hence, the hash value of the new Progger program is di↵erent
from the value inside PCR-23 and the administrator can remotely attest this
change.
6.1.3 Trusted BIOS Configuration
An attacker can access the BIOS of a client machine (e.g., by using a com-
promised BIOS password), and then change the BIOS configuration or update
the BIOS firmware. Any changes in the BIOS can be detected by PCR-0 and
PCR-1. For example, if the BIOS firmware is updated, this change in the
BIOS version can be detected.
6.1.4 Tampered Bootloader
An attacker may launch boot live attacks e.g., an evil maid attack [53]. Any
bootloader that is not the same as the legitimate bootloader tracked by PCR-4,
PCR-5, and PCR-8 will be detected by the TPM chip.
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6.1.5 Change Kernel OS
If the OS kernel is changed by an attacker or updated by a new compromised
kernel, any changes incurred to the OS kernel can be detected by PCR-20.
6.2 Data Provenance with Integrity is Guar-
anteed
In our framework, all chunks of provenance logs are hashed using HMAC on
the client machines. Any changes occurring to a chunk during the data at
transmission or at rest can be detected by comparing the hash value of the
tampered chunk with the original hash value using the HMAC. With this
technique, the integrity of the data provenance can be guaranteed.
6.3 Data Provenance with Confidentiality is
Guaranteed
The provenance and backup servers apply TCG Opal technology to provide full
disk encryption so that confidentiality of the provenance logs can be achieved.
For the backup server, the TPM-sealed feature using the TPM SRK key is
applied to encrypt the provenance logs. The private parts of the TPM keys
never leave the TPM chip; this provides enhanced confidentiality for these keys
and as a result, for the provenance logs.
Moreover, the confidentiality of communications between the provenance
server, backup server, and client machines is guaranteed by TLS connections.
This confidentiality preserves the privacy of the data provenance.
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6.4 Data Provenance with Availability is Guar-
anteed
Originally, the provenance logs are generated and stored in the client machines.
These logs may be destroyed; for example, a virtual machine stores provenance
logs, and then the virtual machine is terminated so the logs will no longer be
available. With the proposed framework, the availability of the provenance logs
can be guaranteed by storing the logs in the provenance and backup servers
for short-term and long-term usage, respectively.
6.5 Remote Attestation
One of the most important features of our framework is that we use the TPM
to provide remote attestation. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other
technology that can provide integrity and confidentiality for the evidence and
remote attestation at the same time. We use a secure method to prevent Man-
In-The-Middle attacks (MITMA), as discussed in section 5.4, and in the event
that an attack does occur, to ensure that it will be detected.
Remote attestation allows the administrator to read the PCR values re-
motely. Each PCR denotes a specific component in the machine (e.g., PCR-0
for BIOS), so any change in the expected value of a specific PCR will be an
indicator that tampering has occurred in this component. In this way we can
check the system status in any stage, whether at run-time or at boot-time.
Chapter 7
Evaluation
In this chapter we will discuss some experiments that we conducted to detect
tampering in the machine at boot time and run time. As discussed earlier, our
framework is based on TPM and Intel-TXT technology. We also used IMA
to detect tampering in sensitive files, especially those that contain provenance
logs. We will present the results mentioned in chapter 6.
Following this, we will evaluate our framework, by comparing it with other
solutions that provide tamper-evidence.
7.1 Detecting tampering in machine compo-
nents
1. Detecting Tampering in BIOS
The hash values that are stored in PCR[0] to PCR[7] by measuring the
boot stage (Fig. 1.1) components (SRTM) can tell us if tampering has
occurred in these components. These components are what the system
should start runs with. Fig. 7.1 shows 24 TPM PCRs. These PCRs
are hash values; each one contains 160 bits. The PCRs from [0] to
[7] are for the SRTM as was explained in detail in chapter 3. When
the hardware components from the CRTM and BIOS are measured and
hashed, the values are stored inside these PCRs. Any changes in these
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Figure 7.1: PCRs in TPM
components will change the hash values inside the PCRs. This will help
the administrator (locally or remotely) to detect any tampering in these
components. It is very important for the administrator to make sure that
the machine components are well-known (this term is defined in section
1.6).
2. Detecting Tampering in the Bootloader
The bootloader is a program that loads the main operating system or
runtime environment for the computer after completion of the self-tests
[66]. Thus, the bootloader is one of the most important components
in the computer system. The measurement value of the bootloader is
hashed and stored securely inside the TPM in PCRs[8-14].
In our implementation we used TrustedGRUB, then PCRs[8-14] were
allocated inside the TPM for the TrustedGRUB bootloader. If an attack
such as an evil maid [53] or live boot attack tries to change the bootloader
to access to the system, the TPM will detect this. When the hash value
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Figure 7.2: Detect BootLoader Tampered
of the bootloader is stored in PCRs[8-14], any change in the bootloader
will change the values inside PCRs[8-4], as we can see in Figure 7.2. Fig.
7.2 shows the PCRs inside the TPM; as we know, each PCR contains
a 160-bit hash value and the PCRs from [8-14] for the TrustedGRUB
bootloader. If an attacker tries to change the bootloader for the machine
this will cause the values of the PCRs to change and this will help the
administrator to detect the attack.
3. Detecting tampering in the OS kernel or the OS
In the same way that we can detect changes in the BIOS or the boot-
loader, we can detect changes due to attack in the OS or in the kernel.
7.2 Detecting Tampering at runtime
Fig. 7.3 shows the mechanism for measuring machine components from boot
time till run time, In our framework we use the Intel-TXT feature to detect
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whether any attacks occur during runtime.
1. Detecting a Tampered Provenance Generator:
The provenance generator is very important since it is the tool that
generates provenance logs. We need to provide integrity for this tool.
Therefore, we hash its code and store this hash value inside PCR-23 on
the machine this tool works on. In this case, if an attacker tries to change
the code of the provenance generator (e.g,. Progger), the administrator
can detect this by checking the value of PCR-23 remotely using a remote
attestation technique. (See chapter 5).
2. Detecting Tampered Chunk: Progger’s output files are very important
when they are the provenance logs. When these logs are to be used as
evidence, it is very important to provide confidentiality and integrity for
these files (chunk files). Fig. 7.4 shows a file 150412 144030.txt, which
was created on April 12,2015 at 14:40:30. The administrator can check
the events on this file using IMA technology which is used to detect
tampering on sensitive files, as explained in section 3.3. The button
part of Fig. 7.4 shows that file 150412 144105.txt, was tampered with
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Figure 7.4: Comparison Between Files Created By Progger
by someone. The hash values in the fourth column are the hash values
of the file (150412 144105.txt), concatenating with the hash values of
PCR[0-7] (template hash which are in the second column on the left).
The hash concatenations stored in PCR-10 will help to detect tampering,
whether locally or remotely, by the administrator using TPM-Quote (see
TPM-Quote in section 5.4).
7.3 Results
In this section we will evaluate our framework against other solutions. We will
compare the results that are presented by these solutions with our framework.
Table 7.1 shows the comparison between di↵erent solutions that provide
tamper-evidence or partial tamper-evidence, as defined in section 1.6. We
evaluate these solutions against our framework based on very important fac-
tors. The solution should be applicable in physical and virtual machines. We
also evaluate our solution against others based on availability, and finally the
evaluation is based on solutions that provide full tamper-evidence or partial
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tamper-evidence.
The first mechanism evaluated with our framework was Progger [40]. Using
Progger to provide full tamper-evidence is not adequate. Progger generates
provenance logs and provides integrity for these logs. But we need a mecha-
nism that guarantees this provenance at-creation and at-storage in a trusted
environment. In addition, the Progger code must be protected to guarantee
that no malicious users can tamper with it. Finally, the mechanism must have
the ability to measure the system at boot process and that cannot be done by
Progger.
The second mechanism is Forensix [26]. The Forensix tool generates data
logs and collects them in database servers. After this, users can submit SQL
queries to retrieve the events that occurred in the machine (e.g., PID, start-
time, end-time). This mechanism provides availability of provenance logs.
However, its authors do not mention any technology which provides secure,
integrity-preserving environments for the database server. This potentially
makes it easy for malicious users to mask their traces by modifying the logs
in the database server or within the server where the provenance logs are
generated.
The third mechanism is [15]. This mechanism can trap and log activities
from system calls in a log file, and then hide the log from the file system.
The administrator can unload the module from the system to use this log for
tamper-evidence. This mechanism cannot provide full tamper-evidence since
it is only measuring system calls. In addition, this mechanism cannot measure
the boot process stages, so we do not know what is happening in the system
at boot time.
The fourth mechanism we chose in this evaluation is the Provenance-Aware
Storage System (PASS) [47]. PASS is a storage system that automatically
collects, stores, manages, and provides searches for provenance. This protocol
does not provide any kind of trust for the environment in which the provenance
was collected. The capture mechanism consists of a set of Linux kernel mod-
73
ules that transparently record provenance; it does not require any changes to
computational tasks. Users can pose provenance queries using nq (new query),
a proprietary tool that supports recursive searches over the provenance graph.
PASS’s capture mechanism often leads to very large volumes of provenance
information; another limitation of this approach is that it is restricted to local
file systems [25].
The fifth mechanism provides tamper-evidence using the TPM [58]. The
authors focus on using the TPM during the boot process, but do not mention
other technologies that are used to provide integrity and confidentiality for
provenance logs at the run time stage(i.e., IMA, Intel-TXT). As mentioned in
chapter 3, the TPM can provide integrity and confidentiality for provenance
logs from boot time until the OS takes over. After that we need technology
that is compatible with the TPM to provide integrity and confidentiality for
provenance logs at run time. The authors also do not provide availability for
provenance logs.
Finally, our framework presents a solution that provides integrity and con-
fidentiality for provenance logs at boot time and run time using a TPM. We
also provide availability of the provenance logs that were collected by storing
these provenance logs in a backup server for archiving purposes. In addition
to this we use Intel-TXT technology to provide secure environments on client
machines where the provenance is created, as well as for the provenance and
backup servers.
If we compare our framework, which is based on a TPM chip in addition to
Intel-TXT and IMA technologies, with solution five in table 7.1, it can be seen
that using the TPM chip alone is not enough to provide full tamper-evidence.
The TPM can measure the components at boot process stages and keep the
hash values in a secure register (PCR). That is a very good solution in terms
of knowing exactly what has happened in these stages, but it cannot detect
events that may occur at run time. Hence, to provide full tamper-evidence
for provenance logs, we should be aware of what has happened in the boot
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Table 7.1: Evaluation
Virtual
machine
Physical
Machine
Availa-
bility
Partial
Tamper-evidence
Full
Tamper-evidence
Progger [40] 3 3 7 3 7
Forensix [26] 7 3 3 3 7
vfs logger [15] 7 3 7 3 7
PASS [47] 3 7 7 3 7
TPM [58] 3 3 7 3 7
Our framework 3 3 3 3 3
process stages and at run time to guarantee that the provenance logs were
created and stored in a secure environment. That can be achieved if and only
if we use technology that detects the code that is currently running, such as
the Intel-TXT technology (explained in chapter 3 and chapter 5). We also
use a special backup server to archive the provenance logs and encrypt these
provenance logs using TPM keys (i.e SRK keys).
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
This thesis aimed to propose a framework that provides tamper-evidence for
logs, especially data provenance logs. We focused on the environments in
which the logs are created and stored. We also focused on the provenance logs
status from boot time until run-time in order to be aware of what was going
on the in the machine, and whether these provenance logs were created and
stored in a secure environment or not. Based on this, we tried to find the best
technologies that could achieve our aim of creating a solution that would make
provenance logs admissible as evidence in a court of law. We found that we
needed to integrate some extra technologies with a TPM, such as Intel-TXT
and IMA in order to provide (Reliability, uthenticity, Admissibility, Complete-
ness, and Believability) for the provenance logs to make them acceptable in a
legal enquiry [48].
In this thesis we have discussed past and current tamper-evidence solu-
tions. As we have shown, there are some solutions based on hardware like
TPM and others based on software such as hash functions. We investigated
the gaps in these existing solutions and found that most cannot provide full
tamper-evidence; most of these solutions collect provenance at the application
level without knowing what is going on in the machine at the boot stages. In
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addition, we found that some of the current tamper-evidence solutions exam-
ine provenance logs after they have been collected at application level. As a
result, if these solutions cannot provide confidentiality for these logs we cannot
accept them, because we cannot guarantee the provenance logs themselves. In
contrast, some of these technologies, such as AEGIS, can provide a secure en-
vironment during the boot process only, without focusing on run time stages;
again, this not enough to provide full tamper-evidence.
We propose a novel tamper-evidence framework for data provenance, and
also propose a remote attestation mechanism based on the TPM. Our frame-
work can be applied to cloud computing environments. We also provide much
needed tamper-evidence for data provenance and our framework complies with
the five major requirements for legal evidence including admissibility, authen-
ticity, completeness, reliability, and believability. Our Framework focuses on
collecting logs and provenance logs that are collected on the machine at dif-
ferent levels from boot time all the way up until run time, and keeping these
provenance logs in secure storage using TPM keys.
Our framework focuses on the integrity and confidentiality of provenance
logs, but can also be applied to any sensitive files as we saw in chapter 5. We
applied the IMA technology to our framework to enable system administrators
to check activities on a specific file and read this activity remotely using a
remote attestation mechanism (explained in Fig. 3.5).
This framework also assures the integrity, confidentiality, and availability
of provenance logs. Confidentiality and integrity of the logs can be provided by
using the features of the TPM, including the use of the TPM keys (e.g., SRK);
these keys never leave the TPM chip, which provides more confidentiality
for our framework. Availability of the provenance logs can be achieved by
storing the provenance logs in provenance and backup servers. In the backup
server, where the information is used for archiving purposes, we encrypted the
provenance logs and the hash values of these provenance logs using the TPM
key. These encryption files cannot be decrypted unless the values of the PCRs
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which were used at encryption time are the same at decryption time.
We also evaluated our framework against other solutions based on a variety
of factors (i.e., VM, PM, Availability, Partial tamper-evidence, Full tamper-
evidence). We found that only our framework can provide availability of prove-
nance logs at physical and virtual machines at the same time. Also, based on
this evaluation, only our framework can detect tampering occurring in the ma-
chine at all stages from boot time all the way up to run time. This is possible
because we used Intel-TXT and IMA with the TPM chip to provide integrity
and confidentiality for the provenance logs and to allow the administrator the
ability to check the confidentiality and integrity of the provenance logs and
the system remotely, using a remote attestation mechanism.
8.2 Future Work
Some research directions can be further addressed in future work, as follows:
• Virtual TPM – A TPM for virtualisation technologies is challenging since
the TPM chip is originally designed for a physical machine. In the physi-
cal machine, the TPM chip can be fully used to measure sensitive compo-
nents inside the machine. However, virtual machine environments have
no actual TPM chips and virtual or software-based TPM chips can be
easily tampered with.
• Trusted Cloud Computing– The rapid adoption and growth of cloud com-
puting has introduced new challenges. One of these challenges arises
when cloud computing is used to store data or applications, without
users knowing if their data has been tampered with by another user or
even if the cloud provider has tampered with the data. Accordingly,
cloud computing users want to know that their data is stored securely,
or at least in a fashion that if tampering happens, they can detect that.
TPM works well with physical machines, but does not scale well with
virtualisation [54]. This is because TPM is limited in resources (e.g., 24
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PCRs). Therefore, we cannot use a TPM chip to provide a root of trust
for large-scale cloud computing, which could have hundreds of virtual
machines. Another problem facing us in the attempt to provide roots
of trust in cloud computing is the owner of cloud computing (provider).
The owner of the data that is deployed in the cloud needs privilege from
the cloud provider to get access to some features in the cloud Application
Programming Interface (API).
• Cloud API – A cloud Application Programming Interface (API) should
be provided to help cloud users access the capabilities of the TPM chip.
However, this API needs to ensure that cloud users can access the TPM
chip even though they usually do not have root access to their subscribed
virtual hosts or underlying physical machines.
• TPM-enabled Private Cloud – A private cloud environment can be pro-
vided by a trusted cloud computing environment using TPM. Open-
source cloud software (e.g., OpenStack) can be integrated fully with TPM
to provide a trusted environment.
• Optimisation for Large Scale Environments –When we implement trusted
computing for virtual machines in data centres, there could be a large
number of physical and virtual machines, generating a large volume of
provenance logs. This large volume of logs being transferred between
client machines and the provenance server may be a major bottleneck in
the whole system. We would need an optimised system for this scenario.
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Appendix A
TPM Locality
Locality is an assertion to the TPM that a command’s source is associated
with a particular component. Locality can be thought of as a hardware based
command authorisation [62]. TPM 1.2 supports six levels of locality, locality
None and Locality 0-4. PC Client platform usage of locality levels is defined in
the PC Client Implementation Specification. TPM 1.2 must support Locality
0-4.
Each PCR, during manufacturing of the TPM, has the locality level set for
two types of operations: reset and extends. Even though the Locality 2 is a
higher locality. If the PCR wants to allow for both Locality 1 and Locality 2,
both bits must be set in the mask. If a command attempts an operation on a
PCR, it must be received from the correct locality.
Table A.1: TPM Locality
Locality Meaning
4 Trusted Hardware/DRTM
3 Software launched by DRTM
2 Controlled by OS/TPM Driver
1 Controlled by OS/TPM Driver
0 SRTM; Default
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Table A.2: The Standard Usage of PCRs
PCR Usage
0 Core BIOS, POST BIOS, Embedded Option ROMS
1 Platform and Motherboard Configuration and Data
2 Option ROM Code
3 Option ROM Configuration and Data
4 IPL Code
5 IPL configuration data
6 State transition (sleep, hibernate, and so on)
7 Reserved for OEM
8 TrustGrub
9 TrustGrub
10 TrustGrub
11 TrustGrub
12 TrustGrub
13 TrustGrub
14 TrustGrub
15 Not Assign
16 Used for debugging
17 Dynamic CRTM
18 Platform defined
19 Used by a trusted operating system
20 Used by a trusted operating system
21 Used by a trusted operating system
22 Used by a trusted operating system
23 Application Support
Appendix B
Figure B.1: Sample of Chunk File
The measurements taken by Integrity Management Architecture are stored
in both binary and ASCII forms /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii runtime mea-
surements and /sys/kernel/security/ima/binary runtime measurements respec-
tively
The ASCII version of the measurements can be viewed in plaintext and
consists of four columns:
• PCR number is the number of the PCR that is extended with the mea-
surement value. In the case of IMA, that it PCR 10.
• template-hash the combined hash of the of the contents of the file and the
?filename hint? for the loaded data, expressed as SHA1(filedata-hash,
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Figure B.2: Sample list of IMA runtime measurements
filename-hint), where filename-hint is 256-byte long.
• Filedata-hash is the hash of the contents of the file containing the loaded
or executed data, expressed as SHA1(filedata-hash).
• Filename-hint is the filename of the included file, or an identifier for the
loaded data (as in the case of ?boot aggregate?, which is the resulting
hash from the PCRs 0-7.
Below follows a sample fragment of the IMA runtime measurements ob-
tained from the host where the compute node ran in the implementation setup.
Appendix C
TPM Commands After the administrator takes ownership of TPM, he has the
ability to manage and use TPM. These command could be locally or remotely.
If the administrator forget the password of the TPM ownership password he
then the only way to reset this password is to reset TPM chip through the
BIOS. And this add more confidentiality to TPM solution.
Table C.1 shows some of TPM command with the description of each com-
mand. These command compatible with TPM 1.2, since we use used this
version in our framework. In this table we tried to choose most important
command that we frequently use it in our framework.
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Table C.1: Some of TPM Commands
TPM Command Description
TPM version Show the version of TPM
TPM takeownership
Basic command for creating an SRK and an owner
for a TPM. Until this command is executed, the TPM
cannot do much of anything.
TPM Extend Used to update a value in a PCR.
TPMNV WriteValue Write to the NVRAM space.
TPMNV ReadValue Read from NVRAM space.
TPM sealdata
seals sensitive input data to the SRK of the system’s
TPM and optionally a PCR configuration.
TPM unsealdata
Decrypt the sensitive data based on the values of PCRS
which was used on seal time.
TPM getQuote
TPM signed the PCR values fromthe chip. The program
to obtain a quote, and thus measure the current state of
the PCRs.
TPM loadkey
The program loads the key in BLOB-FILE into persistent
storage and registers it using the UUID in UUID-FILE.
TPM mkuuid
The program generates a TPM UUID and stores it in the
file UUID-FILE.
TPM updatepcrhash
This program updates the PCR composite hash in file
OLD-HASH-FILE to produce the file NEW-HASH-FILE.
